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This paper is about recent developments in the distribution of
income in industrialized, and particularly, the G-7 countries. Limit-
ingthegeographicalfocusinthiswayignorestheimportantchanges
takingplaceintransitioneconomiesandinthedevelopingworld,but
I have chosen to focus on the countries I know best, which is why a
small,offshoreEuropeanislandreceivesdisproportionateattention.
The paper makes four main points.
(1)Thereisconsiderablediversityofnationalexperiencewith
regard to the distributions of income and earnings; it is
misleading to talk of a general “trend” toward increased
dispersion.
(2) Differences in income distribution can have a sizable impact
ontheassessmentoflivingstandardsacrosscountries,and
on the measured rate of growth of living standards.
(3) The evolution of income distribution cannot be explained
solely in terms of earnings; there has been a significant
turnaround in capital incomes; there have been changes in
the extent of fiscal redistribution.
11(4)Thelinksbetweenmacroeconomicvariablesandthedistri-
bution of personal income are complex; this is an impor-
tant area for further study.
Qualifications
Any account of the empirical evidence must be prefaced with
warnings about the shortcomings of the underlying data and about
the many conceptual issues, which need to be addressed. These
issuesarediscussedatlengthinastudyfortheOrganizationforEco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) by Atkinson, Rain-
water, and Smeeding (1995). I should emphasize in particular that
the evidence presented is a “snapshot” of the income distribution.
Creating individual life histories at a national level is a challenging
task on the research agenda, and I have seen no satisfactory cross-
country studies.
Diversity of national experience
The United States, the United Kingdom, and a number of other
OECD countries, have experienced rising income dispersion since
the 1970s. Chart 1, based on national studies of the distribution of
equivalent disposable household income, shows that this has been
especially marked in the United Kingdom, where the Gini coeffi-
cient (a summary measure of income differences) rose by nearly
half—a very large increase by historical standards. The rise in the
UnitedKingdomseemstohavebeenparticularlysharpinthesecond
halfofthe1980s,comingtoanendafter1990,whentheGinicoeffi-
cient appears to have levelled off or turned down.
In the United States, Japan, and West Germany, increases in dis-
persion are more modest. Between 1979 and the 1990s, the Gini
coefficient in the United States rose from 40 percent to 44 percent
(that is, from an index of 100 to 110). But an increase of one-tenth is
still significant for a statistic of which Henry Aaron once remarked
that “following these data was like watching the grass grow” (1978,
p.17).Thatmayhavebeentrueinthe1970s(seeChart1),butceased
to be true in the 1980s.
12 A.B. AtkinsonYet dispersion increased neither at the same rate nor universally.
Overtheperiodshown,therewasnoincreaseinCanada,France,nor
(over the period as a whole) in Italy. There are contrasting national
experiences, even within the G-7. The same applies if attention is
focusedonthebottomofthedistribution.TakingtheEuropeanCom-
mission definition of financial poverty as living below half the
national average, we find that the United Kingdom stands out for its
sharp rise in poverty over the 1980s, whereas other countries have
seen either a more modest increase or no overall trend. See Chart 2.
The rate for the United States (which is not the official poverty rate,
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Chart 1
Changes in Income Dispersion
Relative to 1977
Sources: Canada, Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997, Appendix Table B; France (1975 = 100),
Atkinson, 1997, Table FR2, Synthèses series; (West) Germany (1978 = 100), Becker, 1996,
Table 1, and Hauser, 1996, Table 1, linked at 1993 using Becker, 1998, Table 4; Italy, Atkin-
son, 1997, Table IT2, Bank of Italy series; Japan (1981 = 100), Gottschalk and Smeeding,
1997, Appendix Table B; United Kingdom, Atkinson, 1997, Table UK3, series constructed





























age points between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s.
Thepictureofdiversityapplieswhenwelookatthedistributionof
individual earnings in Chart 3, which shows the changes since 1977
in the decile ratio. The decile ratio is the ratio of earnings at the top
decile (the person 10 percent from the top) to those at the bottom
decile(theperson10percentfromthebottom).TheUnitedKingdom






Changes in Low Income Since 1977
Sources: Canada, Statistics Canada, 1996, pp. 25-6; France (1975 = 100), Atkinson, 1997,
Table FR3, Synthèses series; Italy, Atkinson, 1997, Table IT4, Commissione series; United
Kingdom, Atkinson, 1997, Table UK4, series constructed by Goodman and Webb, and
Households Below Average Income series; United States, Smeeding, 1997, Table A-4, per-
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and Italy, 1984 for France)
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1977 1983 1985 1989 1995 1979 1987 1981 1991 1993Nor are there signs that the United States and the United Kingdom
were leading indicators, with Europe catching up behind. As the
OECD has observed,
“No clear tendency emerges of a generalized increase in earnings
inequality over the first half of the 1990s. Of the 16 countries ... dis-
persionincreasedinhalfofthem,andwaseitherbroadlyunchanged
or declined somewhat in the rest” (1996, p. 63).
It is misleading, therefore, to talk of a general “trend” toward
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Chart 3
Changes in Earnings Dispersion Relative to 1977
Sources: France, Bayet and Julhès, 1996, p. 48; Canada (1981 = 100), OECD, 1996, Table
3.1; (West) Germany (1983 = 100), OECD, 1996, Table 3.1; Italy, Brandolini and Sestito,
1996, Table 8; Japan (1981 = 100), OECD, 1996, Table 3.1; United Kingdom, Atkinson and
Micklewright, 1992, Table BE1, linked at 1990 to Department of Employment, 1997, Table
A30.2; United States, Karoly, 1994, Table 2B.2, weekly (consistent) wage and salary
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UKincreased dispersion, and even in countries where dispersion has
increased, the historical record is better described as consisting of
“episodes” of widening income differences rather than as following
an inexorable trend.
Distributional differences matter
A recent study by three World Bank economists concluded that
income dispersion varies significantly across countries, but that
within most countries, there is little significant variation over time
(Li, Squire, and Zou, 1998). I agree with the first conclusion but not
with the second.
Chart 4 shows the Gini coefficients for disposable household
incomes in different OECD countries relating mostly to the early
1990s (although 1984 for France and West Germany). There is a
clear geographic pattern, with Scandinavia and Benelux having the
lowest coefficients, followed by the large mainland European coun-
tries, southern Europe, and then the Anglo-Saxon countries. The
rangeisfrom23percentinFinlandto35percentintheUnitedStates.
As has been pointed out by Richard Freeman, the differences
betweentheUnitedStatesandEuropeinthedistributionofearnings
mean that the low paid in the United States fall far behind many of
their European counterparts. According to his estimates, the hourly
compensation in purchasing power of the American man at the bot-
tom decile is half that of the comparable Italian (1994, p. 13). How
far is the same true of household disposable incomes? National Dis-
posable Income per head adjusted using purchasing power parities
was 39 percent higher in the United States in 1990 than in the Euro-
pean Community (the then 12 members). The share of the bottom
fifth in the United States was 5.7 percent. This means that, even
allowing for a difference in real mean income of 39 percent, the bot-
tom fifth in the United States would be worse off than an “average
European”livinginacountrywheretheshareofthebottomfifthwas
greater than 8 percent. If we take the concrete case of Germany,
where the share of the bottom fifth was 9.8 percent, and real income
only 18 percent lower than in the United States, then this group as a
whole is 40 percent better off than their counterparts in the United
16 A.B. AtkinsonStates.Suchacalculationis,ofcourse,opentoobjections.Thereare
differences across countries between National Disposable Income




the assessment of living standards across countries.
The Distribution of Income in Industrialized Countries 17
Chart 4
Gini Coefficients in OECD Countries
Early 1990s
Sources: Gottschalk and Smeeding, forthcoming, Chart 2. Figures relate to 1987 (Ireland),
1989 (France), 1990 (Spain), 1991 (Finland, Netherlands, Italy), 1992 (Belgium, Denmark,
Sweden), 1994 (Germany, Luxembourg, United States), 1995 (Norway, United Kingdom).
The estimates relate to household disposable income per equivalent adult using an equiva-

































































































































































30 30As we have seen in Chart 1, some G-7 countries have seen a sub-
stantial rise in income dispersion over the 1980s. This can make a
significantdifferencetothemeasuredgrowthperformance.Suppose
that national income were to be distributionally adjusted by multi-
plying by (1-Gini coefficient), as proposed by Sen (1976), then we
would get a different perspective of growth rates. For example, tak-
ing the periods 1973-1979 and 1979-1989 (as used by the OECD in
itsHistoricalStatistics),theUnitedKingdomperformancewascon-
siderably better in the 1980s than the 1970s on an unadjusted basis,
butthisimprovementdisappearswhenthedistributionaladjustment
is made. The measured growth rate is effectively halved. Put differ-
ently, those at the bottom did not share in rising prosperity.
This evidence suggests that the distribution of income can change
within countries in a way that is economically significant.
Behind the income dispersion
SofarIhavesimplylookedatasinglesummarystatisticofdisper-
sion, whereas in order to understand the changes, we need to look at
the distribution as a whole. Chart 5 shows the profile of earnings in
fouroftheG-7countriesandhowithaschangedsincethelate1970s.
The charts are similar to the famous “parade” of incomes described
by the Dutch economist, Jan Pen, in which he envisaged everyone
marching past in an hour, with their height corresponding to their
earnings.Aftersixminutes,wecometothetenthpercentile,thefirst
point in Chart 5, where people are about three feet tall; in the 54th




drew a diagram in which the earnings profile rotated, arguing that
thisexplainsboththewideningwagedispersionintheUnitedStates
andtheincreasedunemploymentinEurope.Thelatterarosebecause
the European welfare state, and minimum wage provisions, put a
flooronwages.However,ifrotationofthewage/skillnexuswerethe
full explanation, then we would expect to find the rise at the top in
18 A.B. AtkinsonEurope, even if there were no change at the bottom. From Chart 5, it
can be seen that there is little evidence of this happening. Even on
this microscopic (logarithmic) scale, the United States and the
United Kingdom stand out for the extent of the change at the top as
well as at the bottom.
Afurtherimportantfeatureofthechangesintheearningsdistribu-
tion is what Krugman has called its “fractal” quality: One continues
to find an increase in dispersion even if one considers narrowly
defined groups. Katz and Murphy have documented in the United
States the “striking increase in wage inequality within groups” clas-
sified by sex, education, and work experience (1992). In the United
Kingdom,therehasbeenincreaseddispersionevenwithinnarrowly
defined occupation groups (Atkinson, 1997a).
It is possible to attribute all of this to unobserved differences in
skill,butotherexplanationsseemworthexploring.Therearereasons
to suppose that there has been a shift from company pay policies to
individual negotiation, and for conventional pay norms to break
down.Thisprocessmayacquireadynamicofitsown:Asmorepeo-
pleareremuneratedoutsidetheconventionalnorms,soadherenceto
these norms becomes weaker, and the socially acceptable range of
remuneration widens.
Alan Blinder once said, “If you want to understand the rise in
income inequality in the 1980s, the place to start is with the rise in
wage inequality” (1993, p. 308).
I agree, but one should not stop there. One has to remember that
there are several steps in going from individual earnings to house-
hold incomes. (See the Box 1.) Where more than one person is
employed, we have to add together their earnings. We have to consider
wealth, which generates capital income in the form of rent, divi-
dends, and interest, or indirectly in the form of pensions, payments
from life assurance, and so forth. Real rates of interest have risen,
and this is one potential cause of widening dispersion, which has
tended to be overlooked. In a simple human capital model, higher
costs of borrowing lead to wider compensating differentials.




Sources: France, Bayet and Julhès, 1996, p. 48; Italy, Brandolini and Sestito, 1996, Table 11;
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Chart 5 - continued
Earnings Profile
(Logarithmic scale)
Sources: France, Bayet and Julhès, 1996, p. 48; Italy, Brandolini and Sestito, 1996, Table 11;
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90As well as capital income
and private transfers, we
have to add transfers paid
by the state, and deduct the
amounts paid in income tax
and social insurance contri-
butions,inordertoarriveat
disposable income. There
is, therefore, no reason to
expectdispersionofdispos-
able household income to
follow slavishly dispersion
in individual pre-tax earn-
ings. As Chart 6 shows for
theUnitedKingdom,inthat






the shift in redistributive fiscal policy after the mid-1980s. This is
illustrated in Chart 7, which shows the dispersion of market income
(“Pre”) and income after tax and benefits (“Post”). The Gini coeffi-
cient for market income has varied cyclically, but the predominant
impression is of a long-run rise since the mid-1960s. In the 20 years
from 1965 to 1984, the coefficient increased from 40 percent to 50
percent. What is even more striking is that the coefficient for post-
government income showed scarcely any rise over this period. The
redistributive impact of cash transfers and taxation increased by
enough to offset the more unequal market incomes. After 1984, the
storyisquitedifferent.Thelineformarketincomecontinuedtorise,
but between 1984 (marked by an arrow) and 1990, the Gini coeffi-
cient for post-government income increased much more sharply.
Measuredintermsofthedifferencebetweenthetwocoefficients,the
redistributive contribution of transfers and taxes fell from 19 per-
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=
Equivalent Disposable Income1984) to 11 percentage points. The interpretation of these calcula-
tions raises a number of major issues, such as the incidence of taxa-
tion, the separation of life cycle from other redistribution, and the
valuation of public spending on goods and services. But, taken at
face value, they suggest that the state budget has ceased to offset the
rising dispersion of market incomes, and that the steeper rise in the
Gini coefficient from 1984 to 1990 was associated with reduced
redistributive ambitions of the government.
Links between macro variables and the personal
distribution of income
What is the relationship between the distributional evidence sum-
marized above and the macroeconomy? On the one hand, there are
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Chart 6
Dispersion of Individual Earnings and Disposable
Household Income in UK
Sources: Income from Goodman and Webb, 1994, p. A2; earnings from Atkinson and Mick-
lewright, 1992, Table BE1, extended using data from New Earnings Survey (for example,
Department of Employment, 1997).



















‘72 ‘76 ‘74 ‘78 ‘80 ‘84 ‘82 ‘86 ‘88 ‘90 ‘92expectations that an economic downturn slowed the growth of high
incomes in the United States:
"The slowing growth of household income inequality was
no doubt related to the winding down of the economic ex-
pansion of the 1980s and the ensuing recession in the early
1990s" (Ryscavage, 1995, p. 54).
On the other hand, at least up to the 1980s, a 1 percent rise in the
U.S. unemployment rate was associated with a 1 percent increase in
the official poverty rate (Blinder and Blank, 1986).
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Chart 7
Income Before and After Government Budget in UK
Sources: First series (from 1961) distribution (not equivalized) among households of original
income and final income: 1961-1975, from Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income
and Wealth, 1977, pp. 247 and 251; 1976, from Central Statistical Office, Economic Trends,
January 1982, p. 105 (for 1976) and December 1982, p. 112 (for 1978).
Second series (from 1977) distribution among households of equivalized original income
and post-tax income: Economic Trends, April 1998, p. 58 (for 1977, 1979, 1981, 1983, 1985,
1987, 1989, 1991, 1993-94 to 1996-97), December 1994, p. 65 (for 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984,
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POST
PRETherelationshipis,however,acomplexone.Ifwefollowthrough
the steps in Box 1, then even if unemployment leads to complete
loss of a person’s wage income, the impact on the income distribu-
tion depends on whether there are other earners in the household.






1 to 1. In the United States, the relationship appears to have weak-
ened in the 1980s (Blank, 1993). In 1989, poverty (now measured
according to the official criterion) was, after seven years of expan-
sion,atahigherlevelthanthepeakin1975.IntheUnitedKingdom,
povertyroseasunemploymentfellinthesecondhalfofthe1980s.In
Italy, poverty in 1995 was little higher than in 1980, despite unem-
ployment’s being half again higher.
In the macroeconomic literature, “income distribution” is often
equated with the shares in national income of labor and nonlabor
incomes, or “factor shares.” The main information that students
appeartobegivenonfactorsharesisthattheyareconstantovertime.
According to Mankiw, “Labor income has remained about 0.7 of
total income over a long period of time” (1994, p. 75). In their Euro-
peantextbook,BurdaandWyploszciteKaldor’sstylizedfactsabout
the growth of advanced economies and say that, “Remarkably,
despitetheseculargrowthofwagesandtheconstancyoftherealrate
of interest, the distribution of income between capital and labor has
been relatively stable. The shares of capital and labor incomes in
nationalproduct...fluctuateaboutahorizontaltrend”(1997,p.117).
Chart 9 shows the evolution over time of the share of nonlabor
income in the G-7 countries. In the United States and the United
Kingdom, there does appear to be broad constancy, although even
the five-year average figures show some fluctuations. Poterba
(1997) concludes that there has been a small increase in the United
States: The share is 2 percentage points higher in the 1990s than in
the 1980s. In Japan, the share falls and then rises; in Canada, the
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Chart 8
Percent in Poverty and Unemployment
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Chart 8 - continued
Percent in Poverty and Unemployment
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rather different. In Italy and West Germany, the share fell then rose,
sothatitisnowbacktoitslevelinthe1960s.InFrance,therisesince
1980 is much more marked. There is a variety of experience, but in
the majority of the G-7 countries (five of seven), the evidence sug-
gests that there has been a shift toward nonlabor income since 1980.
This shift has been 5 percentage points or more in Italy, Japan, and
West Germany, and 10 percentage points in France. The mac-
roeconomic distribution of income is not an unchanging constant.
What is the relation with the distribution among households? One
link is through asset prices. If, as suggested by Burda and Wyplosz
(1997), there is a positive relationship between the nonlabor share
andstockmarketvaluations,thenthismayfeeddirectlyintothedis-
tribution of wealth. Over time, there has been a long-run downward
trend in wealth concentration in the United States and the United
Kingdom, as shown in Chart 10, with the spread of popular wealth.
Partofthegainfromanincreasednonlaborshareaccruestopension
funds and other institutions, which tends to raise the wealth of the
majority of the population. But Atkinson and Harrison (1978) also
found a strong positive association between the level of share prices
and the share of top wealth groups. It is, in part, for this reason that
the share of the top 1 percent in the United Kingdom has ceased to
declineoverthe1980s,despiteConservativemeasuressuchaspriva-
tization and the sales of local government-owned housing.
The building of bridges between macroeconomic variables and
distributional outcomes is an urgent research task.
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